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Section 1988 and the "Background" of
Tort Liability
SHELDON H. NAHMOD't
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.'
A group of Chicago police officers assisted in the development of
new constitutional doctrines one morning in 1958, when they allegedly
entered the home of one James Monroe without warning and forced
the occupants to stand naked in the living room while the entire house
was ransacked. Mr. Monroe was arrested and later released without
charges being preferred against him. He later brought suit against the
officers and the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the depriva-
tion of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion . . . ."' Monroe v. Pape3 eventually reached the Supreme Court,
where eight justices held that the alleged misuse of authority could
support a 1983 action against the police officers (though not against the
City of Chicago)' for denial of fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the fourth amendment had
earlier been held by the Court to be applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment' and since section 1983 was enacted pursuant to
authority granted Congress by the fourteenth amendment, the Court
tA.B. 1962, University of Chicago; LL.B. 1965, LL.M. 171, Harvard University;
Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
I Monroe v. Pape, 265 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
2Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinanc(, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities sectred by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'365 US. 167 (1961). Only justice Frankfurter dissented; Justice Harlan wrote a
separate concurring opinion in which justice Stewart joined.
4 The Court held that a municipality is not a "person" within the meaning of the
statute. 365 U.S. at 187-92. See also Moor v. County of Alameda, 409 U.S. 841 (1973)
(doctrine applied even though county suable under state law); City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
412 U.S. 507 (1973) (doctrine applied in an action for equitablu relief). But cf., in the
context of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Hines v. D'Artois, - F. Supp. - , 43 U.S.L.W. 2056
(W.D. La. July 1, 1974).
rWolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United
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reasoned that the alleged fourth amendment violation by defendants
was actionable under section 1983. The Court also held that specific
intent to deprive a person of a federal right was unnecessary to state a
1983 claim.'
It is the Court's reason for its holding on this latter issue that pri-
marily concerns us here. Justice Douglas, in a statement whose impact
has been considerable, asserted: "Section 1979 [now 1983] should be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man respon-
sible for the natural consequences of his actions."7 If tort concepts are
applied to the alleged facts in Monroe, the defendants probably com-
mitted intentional torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of mental distress, and invasion of privacy. Justice
Douglas seemed to imply that the common law of intentional tort-i.e.,
liability even absent specific intent to interfere with a common law
interest so long' as the result of the conduct is intended, 8 -should apply
by analogy to section 1983.
In Monroe, defendants' alleged intentional conduct was such as
to be a cause in fact of plaintiffs' confinement and search which, because
conducted without probable cause, amounted to a deprivation of plain-
tiffs' fourteenth amendment rights. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs' four-
teenth amendment interests and their common law interests such as
freedom from confinement, from offensive bodily contact and the ap-
prehension thereof, from mental distress, and from invasion of privacy
seemed to coincide, Monroe was a relatively easy case in which to apply
tort concepts.
However, one wonders how far to apply the "background of tort
liability" in a 1983 context. Some federal courts interpret this dictum
literally, thus making tort concepts determinative of 1983 liability.'
Yet it is, after all, a federal statute that is involved, one which refers
in relevant part to constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities.10
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), however, was not applied to the states until Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).6 365 U.S. at 187.
7Id.
1 For example, harmful or offensive conduct for battery, or confinement for false
imprisonment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 35 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT].
9 See notes 81-94 mtpra & text accompanying.
10 In Monroe, Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, stated:
It would indeed be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of
common-law rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those
injuries which only a state official can cause and against which the Constitution
provides protection.
365 U.S. at 196 n.5.
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This article will therefore explore the relevance of tort concepts in a
1983 context, including the issues of duty, proximate cause, negligence,
strict liability, and defenses.
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1983
In Monroe, Justice Douglas suggested three purposes of section
1983: to "override certain kinds of state laws," to provide "a remedy
where state law [is] inadequate," and "to provide a federal remedy
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, [is] not available
in practice."12 This approach, based on inadequacy of state law, was
apparently expanded later in the opinion: "The federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked."'2 As a result of such
language, and because of the apparent breadth of the language of sec-
tion 1983, there has been considerable dispute over its scope."
While such debate is thoughtful, reflecting as t does a legitimate
concern with the federal-state relationship, 5 for practical purposes it has
"I While some federal decisions indicate that there can be ro 1983 action grounded
in negligence, e.g., Hopkins v. County of Cook, 305 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. Pennsylvania, 281 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Kent v. Prosse, 265 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 385 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1967) ; there
nevertheless appear to be indications to the contrary, e.g., Brow-n v. United States, 486
F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973) (willing to hear action on negligence lut not "imputed" negli-
gence); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972); Byrd v. Brishke, 446 F.2d 6
(7th Cir. 1972) ; Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. Averett,
424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). Cf. Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972) ;
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 901 (1969) ; and Huey
v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See notes 50-73 . epra & text accompany-
ing.
Cases involving the applicability of respondeat superior are not discussed in this
article. Compare, e.g., Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973) and Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (not applicable) with Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d
358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (applicable). The
Ninth Circuit, in Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (1971),,staed that its applicability
depends upon the law of the state in which the federal court sits Apparently in accord
is the Fifth Circuit. See Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590 (1973). Nor is the scope of offi-
cial immunity considered here. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
12 365 U.S. at 173-74.
Is Id. at 183.
"4 One commentator argues against the supplementary remedy approach because it
does not encourage states to improve their remedies against police misconduct. Note,
Linting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1486
(1969). A second suggests that while "garden variety" torts should not ordinarily be
covered by section 1983, "outrageous" torts accompanied by physical coercion should be.
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 277 (1965). Still another argues for a balancing test in order to determine whether
an injured plaintiff has recourse to the federal courts under secdon 1983. Note, Civil
Rights and State Authority: Toward the Production of a Just Eq.-ilibrium, 1966 Wis. L.
R-v. 831.
15 The concern relates to what some have considered increased federal intrusion in
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been mooted. Monroe clearly adopted the supplementary remedy ap-
proach and did not use a balancing test in order to determine whether
a constitutional right had been violated so as to be actionable under
section 1983. Additionally, it has been pointed out that "[s]evere de-
privations can result from civilized conduct"16 as well as from outra-
geous conduct. A sheriff's honest mistake resulting in erroneous con-
tinued imprisonment of an inmate," for example, and the failure of a
court clerk to accept for filing a prisoner's petition for post-conviction
relief,"8 while "civilized," have nevertheless been held actionable under
section 1983.
The broad scope of section 1983 is reflected in two lines of cases. 9
The first involves sections of the Bill of Rights previously thought to
serve only as a shield against governmental action. These cases reflect a
double incorporation approach, in which certain sections of the Bill of
Rights are made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment; violations of those sections are then made actionable by section
1983.2o The second line of cases involves deprivations of rights secured
by the fourteenth amendment "directly," not through incorporation of a
specific article of the Bill of Rights'- Both indicate that it is consti-
tutional interpretation which is involved in 1983 cases, and that section
1983's broad language is being taken at face value.
Inasmuch as constitutional or federal statutory issues are necessarily
implicated by section. 1983,2" that section should properly be interpreted
local matters as well as the expansion of the federal caseload because of section 1983.
See, e.g., Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section x983, Comity, and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORaE
557. Cf. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1973); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 558 (1968) (exhaustion of state or administrative remedies not required
in 1983 cases).
16 Note, supra note 14, 82 HARv. L. REv. at 1507.
17 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 901 (1969),
discussed infra at notes 41-49.
1s McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972), discussed infra at notes 51-60.
19 See Shapo, supra note 14, at 300-03, 321, 329.
20 Examples are Monroe, Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968), and Jenkins
v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1970), also discussed infra at notes 69-74 (all involv-
ing the fourth amendment).21 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Examples in a 1983 context are
McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972) (right of access to courts guaranteed
by due process) ; Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972) (right to be free
from summary punishment guaranteed by due process); and York v. Story, 324 F.2d
450 (9th Cir. 1963) (right of privacy guaranteed by due process). Now that the right
of privacy has been apparently accorded constitutional status by the Supreme Court, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ; its poten-
tial under section 1983 seems greatly increased. But cf. Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets,
Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973) ; and Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1973).
22 This article is concerned with constitutional rights, privileges and immunities under
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as creating a cause of action for damages which is national in scope,
uniform in application, and hence not dependent upon local tort law."
When Justice Douglas spoke of the "background of tort liability," he
may have been suggesting the development of a specialized federal
common law of tort in 1983 cases. Because tort hw and section 1983
might serve different purposes and protect different interests, this federal
common law should be developed with a view to effectuating the pur-
poses of section 1983.24
Until recently one could confidently stand with Professor Seavey,
who viewed the tort action essentially, though not exclusively, as a means
"to compensate for harm."2  In contrast, commentators have lately
argued that the dominant function of tort law, including negligence
theory, "is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about,
at least approximately, the efficient-the cost-justified-level of accidents
and safety."26 There are, however, practical problems with such an ap-
section 1983 and not those derived from federal legislation. Hov. ever, the analysis in the
text respecting the primacy of federal policy and the utility of tort concepts seems equally
applicable to statutory rights, privileges and immunities.2 3 Cf. NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944) (holding that the statutory term
"employees" in the National Labor Relations Act ought not to be subject to local state
law: "The Wagner Act is federal legislation, administered by a federal agency, in-
tended to solve a national problem on a national scale"); and Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding that subjecting the issuance of com-
mercial paper by the United States to the application of state laws "would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws
of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain ") See also Chevigny,
Section z983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 H.Rv. L. RE . 1352, 1357 (1970).2 4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), which provides in relevant part that to the extent
that federal law does not "furnish suitable remedies" for violations of section 1983, the
court should use "the common law [of the state in which the federal court is located]
so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States." This has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as requiring those federal and
state rules of damages which are used in civil rights cases to serve "the policies ex-
pressed in the federal statutes." Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240
(1969). Cf. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); ,ee also Comment, Civil
.4ctions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1015,
1023-25 (1967); Friendly, it Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964). Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
25 Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REv. 72 (1942). It might be more ac-
curate to characterize this as a qualified compensation function to allow for the concept
of "fault" in the sense of a departure from a socially required st-ndard of conduct. An
unqualified compensation function would justify a strict liability system. That such a
system has not predominated at common law indicates that compensation should not be
viewed as the exclusive function of tort liability. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PRoTECrioN FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIm 242 (1965): "More precisely, the objective [of
tort law] is to determine whether to compensate and if so, how."
2 0 Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEcA. STuDrS 29, 33 (1972). See also
Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 3. LAW & EcoN. 201
1974]
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proach, including the assumption of perfect foresight by the parties in-
volved, and the necessity of an after the fact assessment of relative costs
of accident and avoidance by the trier of fact2 7 One therefore ought to
be careful about broad generalizations respecting the functions of tort
law. Perhaps the most that can be said for present purposes is that
different functions may be served at the same time. While compensa-
tion should no longer be considered the essential function of tort law,
perhaps it nevertheless remains an important one.
So far as appears from the legislative history, with its references
to the reluctance of the South's legal systems to provide remedies for
unpopular plaintiffs," compensation is similarly a function of section
1983. Compensation would appear to be an especially significant func-
tion of section 1983 when there is no adequate state remedy. The
Supreme Court, however, emphasized in Monroe that even where the
plaintiff has adequate recourse against, a state official under state law,
the 1983 remedy is still available, indicating that compensation is not
currently thought to be the major function of section 1983. Rather,
because constitutional interests are at stake, deterrence, as furthered
by the private enforcement of fourteenth amendment guarantees," might
(1971). Posner's analysis begins with Learned Hand's famous negligence "formula!' in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). He suggests that Hand
was formulating in rough form an economic view of negligence to the effect that if the
cost of preventing the accident is less than the cost of the accident (discounted by its
probability), then society in economic terms is better off if the costs are incurred and
the accident avoided. If the cost of prevention exceeds the cost of the accident (again,
discounted by its probability), then society is better off foregoing accident prevention.
Perhaps the most influential of such commentators, Professor Calabresi, states:
"Apart from the requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal func-
tion of accident law is to reduce the sums of the costs of accidents and the costs of
avoiding accidents." G. CALABREsi, THE CosT OF ACCIDENTs 26 (1970). But cf. Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAgv. L. Rnv. 537 (1972).
27 Such considerations have led to a suggestion that the inquiry ought instead to be
which party to an accident is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis and to
act on the decision once made. It is argued that this "strict liability" approach is better
suited to generating economically efficient conduct than the negligence approach. See Cala-
bresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.. 1055 (1972).
28The relevant legislative history is set out in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-87
(1961).
291n the congressional debates for section 1983, Senator Pratt of Indiana spoke as
follows:
Vigorously enough are the laws enforced against Union people. They only fail
in efficiency when a man of known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes
their aid. Then Justice closes the door of her temples.
CONG. GLOBE., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1871), quoted in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 178. And in
the quotation 'from Monroe opening this article, Justice Douglas speaks of the concern
that "state laws might not be enforced" and fourteenth amendment rights "might be de-
nied by the state agencies." Id. at 180.
State and federal enforcement of fourteenth amendment guarantees might be irregu-
lar for various good faith reasons, including resources, lack of knowledge of the viola-
[Vol. 50:5
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be more important under section 1983 than it is under tort law. This is
not to say either that compensation and deterrencc are mutually exclu-
sive categories, or that this general sense of section 1983's functions,
gathered from its legislative history, can be any more than a rough guide
for approaching 1983 cases. Nevertheless, it is important to be sensi-
tive to the possible differences in function of tort law and 1983 liability.
That the purposes of section 1983 are not necessarily consistent
with those of tort law appears by analogy from the Supreme Court's
more recent decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,"0 where the Court held that the fourth
amendment may give rise to a cause of action for damages for its viola-
tion by federal officers." This decision may have been prompted in
part by the Court's sense that the exclusionary rule alone does not operate
effectively to deter police misconduct.3 2 If so, a fourth amendment tort
action or a 1983 action could serve the necessary deterrent function.
This is especially true where the plaintiff, for theoretical or practical
reasons, has no effective state cause of action against the defendant.
Moreover, even if the 1983 action is supplementary to an existing and
adequate state remedy, it might still help deter unconstitutional conduct
because it provides access to a federal forum wich might not only
possess greater expertise and sympathy with respect to constitutional
rights than a state forum, but also might not have the state forum's "in-
herent potential for bias. '"' Significantly, because of the aforementioned
differences in purpose of section 1983 and general tort law, the ap-
plication of tort doctrine in a 1983 context may lead to a result incon-
sistant with federal policy. 4 This danger is emphasized by the Court
tion and the like, as well as for deliberately discriminatory reas ms. It has accordingly
been suggested that the Supreme Court in Monroe should have held that cities and mu-
nicipal corporations are "persons" under section 1983. McCormack, Federalism and Sec-
tlion z983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutiona' Protections, Part I, 60
VA. L. REv. 1, 29 (1974). The author argues that vicarious liability would have been a
more effective deterrent than state officer 1983 liability standing alone, id., a position
with which I agree. However, the Court rejected this approach because of its view of the
congressional intention. 365 U.S. at 191.30403 U.S. 388 (1971).
310ne may similarly view section 1983 not as creating new substantive rights, but
rather as the statutory vehicle for the creation of a constitutio lal cause of action for
damages, whereby the fourteenth amendment is not only a shield but a sword.
32 See Chief Justice Burger's discussion of this issue in his dissenting opinion in
Bivens. 403 U.S. at 411. But see Dworkin, Fact Style Adiudication and the Fourth
Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 330-34 (1973).
S Chevigny, supra note 23, at 1356-57.
84 This is so because "[t]he common law . . . may create immunities that do not
apply to an action under § 1983. Conversely, the developing law of torts may extend
potential liability to some defendants beyond the reach of the federal statute." Carter v.
Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.), revzd on other grounds, 409
19741
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in Bivens in its response to the defendants' argument that the
fourth amendment only limits federal defenses to a state law claim and
may not be the source of an independent claim:
The interest protected by state laws regulating trespass and
the invasion of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be inconsistent or even hostile.85
Unfortunately, many 1983 cases apply tort law as if with blinders
respecting the federal policy involved, seemingly making tort law de-
terminative of 1983 liability. It is clearly unfair to blame Justice
U.S. 418 (1972). Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (important
common law criteria of defamation inconsistent with the first amendment).
35403 U.S. at 394. Analogous inconsistencies between federal policy and common
law tort concepts have arisen in the areas of securities regulation and antitrust law. For
example, SEC rule 10b-S, promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, has ordinarily been thought primarily to protect the interests of investors
in being able to make informed decisions, see generally Note, The Controlling Influence
Standard in Rule tob-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HAxv. L. RF-v. 1007 (1973),
interests analogous to those furthered by the tort of misrepresentation. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that there has resulted a line of lOb-5 cases which borrow concepts ex-
tensively from the common law tort of misrepresentation. However, lb-5 also regulates
a range of activities involving internal corporate mismanagement, thereby implicating
the corporate interest in having confidence in those entrusted with the corporation's se-
curities dealings. It has therefore been suggested that as a matter of 10b-5 policy "the
courts should fully accept the [alternative] 'controlling influence' standard in lOb-5
corporate mismanagement cases," id. at 1009, because "a test which focuses on disclosure
[and its relations, deception and reliance] ignores the reality that even while making full
disclosure a person can, through the wrongful exercise of controlling influence, induce a
corporation to enter a damaging transaction." Id. at 1046. A second example in the
area of securities law involves section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Supreme Court held that this section
gives rise to a private cause of action. The court also indicated, as Professor Loss puts
it, that "the consequences of violation of the proxy rules are to be determined as a matter
of judge-made, federal law." 5 L. Loss, SEcumTias REGuLATioN 2940-41 (Supp. 1969)
(emphasis in original). See notes 23 & 24 supra. Federal policy, and not possibly incon-
sistent state law respecting appropriate remedies, is given primacy.
A final example involves section 4 of the Clayton Act which provides that any per-
son "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws" has a private right of action for "threefold the damages by him sustained . . .
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). In large measure because of the drastic nature of the treble
damage remedy, the burden on a particular industry, unfairness of permitting a windfall
to one injured incidentally and the danger of a flood of litigation, Pollock, The "Injury"
and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 691,
699 (1963), the concept of causation under section 4 seems somewhat more restrictive
than the traditional tort concept. Thus, the "target area" doctrine takes the place of an
inquiry into proximate cause and the "more substantial cause" test takes the place of
both the substantial factor and but-for tests for cause-in-fact. See generally S. OPPEN-
Ermi & G. WEsToN, FnEaL. ANTITRUsT LAws 873-92 (3d ed. 1968) (treble damage
suits). However, because section 4 is an important antitrust enforcement tool, it has
been suggested that there will be, and ought to be, an expansion of the concept of who
may be a plaintiff, a "proximate cause" inquiry. Kerr, Private Antitrust Plaintiffs-Ad-
ditional Advantages, 10 DUQUESNE L. REv. 177, 187-88 (1971).
[Vol. 50:5
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Douglas' dictum for this, but it is apparent that many courts have seized
upon the "background of tort liability" catch phrase with little consid-
eration given to the background of 1983 liability.
THE PRIMA FACIE 1983 CAUSE OF AcTION
Duty and Standard of Conduct
In the usual tort case involving either intentional or negligent
conduct, the issues of duty and standard of condvct are characterized
as questions of law.3" Section 1983, in contrast, is silent on the question
of the basis of liability, i.e., whether liability must be based on inten-
tional or negligent conduct, or even conduct without fault."7 However,
section 1983 does indicate what must be caused by a defendant's con-
duct: "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution . . . ." And because it is constitutional interpreta-
tion that is taking place when section 1983 is involved, the constitu-
tional standard of conduct is a question for the court, not the factfinder,
although whether it has been departed from is for the factfinder (assum-
ing reasonable men can differ) just as it is in ordinary tort cases.8
Similarly, whether defendant in a 1983 case is under a duty to con-
form to the constitutional standard of conduct is a question for the court
and is also answered by reference to constitutional interpretation. 9
Consequently, in every section 1983 case4' a constitutional duty
and standard of conduct must be identified and constitutional policy
considered. This was apparently not done in an influential Fifth Circuit
decision which, although a "false imprisonment" case, has occasionally
sGRESTATEMENT §§ 328B(b), (c). While this section app(ies on its face to negli-
gence, the existence of a duty and the general standard of conduct are questions for the
court in intentional tort cases as well.
3a However, section 1985(3), which has been recently interpreted by the Supreme
Court as encompassing private persons' conduct, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88(1971), speaks in relevant part of a conspiracy "for the purpos . of depriving . . . any
person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws." Accordingly, section 1985(3) has consistently been held to require in-
tentional conduct; e.g., in Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
38 RESTATEMENT § 328C(b).
3a As Monroe and Bivens clearly indicate, this issue of constitutional interpretation
should not depend upon the nature of any state duty which might also be involved in the
particular case. In many situations there will be a corresponding state duty which was
breached. The point is that the federal claim under section 1933 is independent of any
state claims arising out of the same occurrence, although statutory duties may be rele-
vant to the defendant's authority to act and to the existence of "color of law" or state
action. Such an emphasis on duty under section 1983 encourages the court to concentrate
upon the constitutional rights, privileges and immunities allegedly violated by the de-
fendant's conduct. See text accompanying notes 75-80 infra.
40 Except for those cases involving rights, privileges and immunities derived from
federal law rather than from the Constitution. See note 22 supra.
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been improperly cited for the proposition that negligence may serve as
the basis of liability under section 1983. In Whirl v. Kern," defendant
sheriff had not been apprised of the dismissal of charges against plaintiff,
who was in custody; and as a result plaintiff "languished in jail for
almost nine months after all charges against him were dismissed."'"
Upon a jury finding that plaintiff's detention was not the result of
negligence, judgment was entered for defendant on the 1983 claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, stating:
While not easily characterized, the case at bar seems to us closest
to the situation where the jailor keeps a prisoner beyond the lawful
term of his sentence. In such circumstances, as in the one before
us, ignorance of the law is no excuse.'3
The court thus indicated that absence of notice of unlawful confinement
is irrelevant to the existence of the tort of false imprisonment" and
hence to the 1983 claim. Alternatively, the court resorted to the fiction
of constructive notice of the termination of charges against plaintiff."
In its discussion, the court assumed that the elements of the 1983
41407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
42 1d. at 785.
481d. at 791.
44 RsTATEMENT § 45 reads as follows:
If the actor is under a duty to release the other from confinement, or to aid in
such release by providing a means of escape, his refusal to do so with the in-
tention of confining the other is a sufficient act of confinement to make him
subject to liability.
-1 The court's uncertainty on this issue is understandable since the relevant Restate-
ment section is on its face unclear. This section (§ 45) speaks of a defendant's refusal
to release a plaintiff when under a duty to do so, and adds to this a requirement that the
refusal must be "with the intention of confining the other." Does this mean that a de-
fendant must know of his legal duty to release the plaintiff or only that there must be
intentional confinement after the duty arises, regardless of the defendant's knowledge of
the duty?
While neither the Restatement nor its illustrations answer this question, the case
which serves as the basis for Illustration 1 does. Weigel v. McCloskey, 113 Ark. 1, 166
S.W. 944 (1914). Weigel indicates that a defendant need not know of the illegality of a
plaintiff's continued confinement, but only that the plaintiff must be intentionally confined
after the duty to discharge has arisen. And this was the case in Whirl just as it was in
Weigel. Perhaps the court mentioned constructive notice as an alternative holding be-
cause of its concern that without it the facts in Whirl seemed to involve nonfeasance,
typically raising a negligence issue, not a false imprisonment issue. However, false im-
prisonment might be a negligent tort as well. The Restatement in a caveat leaves open
the question whether a cause of action for negligent false imprisonment should be upheld
where the confinement is "of such duration or character as to make the other's loss of
freedom a matter of material value." RESTATEMENT § 35(2). This option, though, was
removed from the court in Whirl by the jury verdict that defendant was not negligent;
it had only false imprisonment to deal with. Consequently, while the court never ade-
quately discussed the nature or the source of the constitutional duty breached by de-
fendant, the result in Whirl is nevertheless consistent with traditional false imprisonment
doctrine.
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claim before it exactly tracked the elements of the common law tort
of false imprisonment. Only in a footnote did the court mention that
the defendant did not "contest the fact that [plaintiff] was deprived
of liberty and due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment."" But even assuming a fourteenth amendment violation, why
should defendant's reasonable mistake be actionable under section 1983?
There is a hint of an answer respecting the prima facie 1983 claim in the
court's discussion of whether good faith should be a. defense in the case
before it.4 7 In responding in the negative, the court reasoned that "as
a matter of federal policy such a defense should not be available to a
jailor in circumstances like those before us."4 A failure of communi-
cation, the court said, should be the responsibility of the jailor, not the
prisoner. The court emphasized the relative leisure available to a
jailor in the performance of his duties, as compared with a policeman
making an arrest.
While the court does not elaborate upon this "federal policy," it
seems, at least implicitly, to have weighed the interests involved in
arriving at its conclusion. Such interests include not only the abilities
of the respective parties to avoid the unjustified imprisonment of the
plaintiff but also the latter's interest in not being imprisoned, an interest
seemingly based upon the fourteenth amendment. Apparently Whirl
stands for the proposition that a person acting under color of law who
confines another against his will may be liable under section 1983
even though the confinement is based upon a reasonable good faith mis-
take. Put another way, the person has a fourteenth amendment duty
not to confine another illegally.
While this is consistent with tort law, which imposes liability for
false imprisonment even for a reasonable mistake as to the identity of
plaintiff or the existence of a privilege to detain," tort law in this regard
might go further than section 1983 should. Compensating an injured
plaintiff for false imprisonment might be appropriate even where a de-
-o 407 F.2d at 786 n.4.
47This question was raised because the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.547 (1967), held that good faith and a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest is a
defense to a 1983 action against a police officer for false arrest. The court in Whirl
pointed out that this defense tracked the common law defense to a false arrest claim
against a police officer. See RESTATEMENT §§ 121(b), (c) ; see also comment g. In con-
trast, good faith is not a defense to false imprisonment. See notes 90-97 infra & text
accompanying.
48 407 F.2d at 792.
49 See RESTATEMENT § 44 (motive and purpose irrelevant to liability). Cf. RESTAT-
MENT § 120A (shopkeeper's privilege of detaining for reasonable investigation one who
is reasonably believed to have shoplifted).
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fendant had acted reasonably. In contrast, because section 1983 was
enacted in part to assure state compliance with the fourteenth amend-
ment, a relevant question for 1983 liability in this kind of situation
should be whether such liability furthers adherence to the commands of
the fourteenth amendment. Perhaps the court thought that imposing
liability upon sheriffs would indeed encourage them and their employers
to institute procedures which would prevent such errors. On the other
hand, the court in Whirl might simply have adopted the compensation
approach to section 1983. This could explain why it shifted the loss to
the defendant despite the fact that he apparently had to bear it alone.
In either case the Fifth Circuit should explicitly have dealt with such
considerations.
Negligence as a Basis of 1983 Liability
From the perspective of tort law, Whirl is in reality a false im-
prisonment case involving intentional conduct, that is, the confinement
of the plaintiff. There are, however, a few cases which have expressly
upheld a 1983 action based on negligent conduct."0 In McCray v. Mary-
land," petitioner alleged that the Clerk of the Baltimore City Court
had negligently impeded the filing of his petition for state post-convic-
tion relief. The district court dismissed the complaint because there
was no allegation of a violation of a federally protected right. The
150 Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S.
418 (1972), argued, in dictum, that a complaint, alleging that the superiors of a police
officer who had beaten plaintiff after arresting him without probable cause were negligent
in not properly training, instructing, supervising and controlling the police officer, stated
a cause of action under section 1983. While the police officer's intentional conduct vio-
lated plaintiff's fourth and hence fourteenth amendment rights, the court never addressed
the question whether the officer's superiors, as a matter of constitutional and statutory
interpretation, ought to be liable under section 1983. The court simply assumed that this
is so. The only case cited as authority was Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.
1971), discussed at note 77 infra, which was later modified to exclude the 1983 claim on
the merits. 456 F.2d 834 at 835.
Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972) upheld a 1983 claim against police officers
who allegedly stood by while plaintiff was beaten in their presence by unknown officers.
While the court did not discuss the constitutional source of defendant's duty to intercede,
it seemed to characterize the defendant's conduct as a breach of duty through inaction
and hence as negligence. Id. at 10-11. On the other hand, while intentional torts ordi-
narily require some affirmative conduct, occasionally an intentional failure to act serves
as the basis for liability for an intentional tort. False imprisonment is an example, as
discussed in note 45 supra. It might similarly be suggested here that from a tort perspec-
tive, defendant committed the intentional tort of battery. His failure to act was inten-
tional (in the tort sense of either purposeful or knowledgeable with substantial certainty)
and was a cause in fact of plaintiff's injuries. See also Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971), addendum, 456 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1972),
discussed in text accompanying note 77 infra.
51456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff's con-
stitutionally based right of access to the courts had been violated, and
that his complaint therefore stated a negligence claim cognizable under
section 1983.52 It first cited three recent decisions"s for the proposition
that "a section 1983 action may be based on negligence when it leads to
a deprivation of rights."54 The court then proceeded to characterize
the injury to plaintiff as a denial of a constitutional right of access to
the courts based apparently on the fourteenth amendment simpliciter.
But the court nowhere explains how it reasoned from the existence of
a violation of plaintiff's constitutional right of access to a determina-
tion that the alleged negligence could serve as the basis for the plaintiff's
1983 claim for damages.
Negligence involves the departure from a standard of conduct
arrived at by weighing factors such as the gravity of harm, the prob-
ability that harm will occur, and the cost of avoiding the risk-creating
conduct.55 But these factors are not relevant when the standard of
conduct is derived from a statute; here the legislature's standard is
often binding, and departure from it constitutes (for want of a better
term) negligence per se. Even though such statutes are often more
specific in defining the conduct regulated than is section 1983 on its face,
where the duty is derived from the Constitution its breach might also
be the equivalent of negligence per se. Moreover, if this breach may
not be excused, then it becomes the equivalent of strict liability." Indeed,
it seems proper to characterize Whirl, discussed earlier, as a case in
which the fourteenth amendment functions to impose on the defendant
a duty to release, the breach of which renders him absolutely liable.
From a tort perspective, this duty might be analogized to statutory
duties whose breach may not be excused because the person adversely
affected is not in a position to protect himself. 7 In contrast to Whirl,
the court in McCray speaks of negligence, thus implying that if the
521d. at 6.
13 Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd o,z other grounds, 409 U.S.
418 (1972) ; Jenldns v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970) ; and Whirl v. Kern, 407
F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969). Averett and Whirl, how-
ever, involved not ordinary negligence, but gross negligence and false imprisonment re-
spectively.
54456 F.2d at 5.
55 W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or ToRTS 145-49 (4th ed. 1971).
16 Cf. id. at 197:
It is entirely possible that a statute may impose an absolute duty, for whose
violation there is no recognized excuse. . . . Such a statute falls properly
under the head of strict liability, rather than any basis of negligence . ...5
7See RESTATEmENT § 288A, comment C. Cf. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526,
27 N.W.2d 555 (1947).
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defendant is ultimately found to have acted reasonably, hence non-
negligently, he will not be liable.5"
Even if it is found that a defendant in a McCray-type case has
acted reasonably, there still would seem to be a fourteenth amendment
violation for which injunctive relief would be available. This is com-
parable to various constitutionally based exclusionary rules in criminal
contexts which operate as a general matter irrespective of the reason-
ableness of the conduct of the police officer. Thus, in McCray, the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct seems relevant only with
respect to liability for damages and not the existence of a fourteenth
amendment violation. Hence it is important to ask what the function of
reasonableness should be. If an essential goal of section 1983 is the
effective enforcement of fourteenth amendment rights, then a four-
teenth amendment duty approach seems preferable to a negligence ap-
proach. The plaintiff should not have to prove that defendant's conduct
was unreasonable to state a 1983 cause of action. 9 In addition, the pur-
pose of compensating for injuries to constitutional interests seems pro-
moted if plaintiff does not have this burden. Under this approach, more-
over, the articulation of the constitutional standard of conduct properly
becomes a question for the court; the jury would consider only the issues
of breach, causation and damages.8 Finally, removing the inquiry into
reasonableness from the prima facie 1983 claim clarifies the consti-
tutional issues which may be involved, and is consistent with the
language of section 1983 itself.
Considerations such as these should have been addressed both in
McCray and in Jenkins v. Meyers," a recent federal district court
decision. In Meyers, a prisoner brought a 1983 action for damages and
58 But how does one determine whether conduct in the McCray context is reason-
able? Is reasonableness determined by a cost-benefit analysis which takes into account
the probability and gravity, of the potential harm to plaintiff, i.e., delayed access to the
courts? It would appear that the gravity of this harm implicates constitutional interests,
unlike the harm in an ordinary negligence case which a jury might assess more intelli-
gently. On the other hand, juries in 1983 cases do in fact determine damages. In order
to do so, they have to value the intangible constitutional interests interfered with as well
as the more usual kinds of personal injury or property damage. If they are presumably
capable of doing this, they could similarly be capable of determining, with proper in-
structions, whether a defendant acting under color of law has acted reasonably.
59 This is not to say that reasonableness is not relevant to available defenses and de-
fendant's ultimate liability, but only that it should not be relevant to the prima fade 1983
claim.
60 It follows that the scope of the fourteenth amendment duty, or what might be
termed the proximate cause question, is similarly a question for the court. See discussion
in notes 80-88 infra & text accompanying.
51338 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. 111. 1972), aff'd without opii on, 481 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir.
1973).
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injunctive relief against various prison officials because of their alleged
negligent failure to mail a trial transcript to plaintiff's attorney. The
alleged injury was the loss of a post-conviction hearing and a delayed
direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the
action for two reasons. First, there was no injury to plaintiff because
he could still proceed with his attempt to secure post-conviction relief.6 2
The court did not seriously consider the argument that the failure to
mail the transcript had been a substantial factor in causing the delay in
plaintiff's appeal, delay of the sort which would scem to constitute the
injury allegedly incurred in McCray.
The second ground for the Meyers court's decision was that negli-
gence of the kind presented is not cognizable under section 1983. After
noting that the transcript had been inadvertently misplaced, the court
declared that "mere negligence involving an act void of not only specific
intent but intent as such, is not grounds for a § 1983 suit."'  It char-
acterized the case before it as fitting into a category
where there is a deprivation of a constitutional right but the act
bringing about that violation was an unconscicus one, a pure
mistake, and the factual as well as the legal result were unintended.
Thus, not only was there an absence of both improper motive and
specific intent-there was no motive and no intent whatsoever
since the defendant was not cognizant that the act was taking place
no less the legal implications of that act."'
In ruling as it did on this issue, the district court reached a result
different from that in McCray, which similarly involved inadvertent
conduct." Yet one wonders what the court mean3 when it refers to
the negligence in Meyers as involving an act which was unconscious.
The act of misplacing the transcript seems consciois in the sense that
it was done by one who deliberately and volitionally picked it up and
placed it where it did not belong. Some light is 3hed on the court's
reasoning by a hypothetical raised in the opinion: suppose the defend-
ants in Meyers had intentionally mailed the transcript to a wrong address
thinking it was proper and legal to do so. The court indicates that since
the result was intended and the act conscious, section 1983 would apply.6
Apparently the court is distinguishing between the state of mind nec-
essary for the tort of conversion (which seems to require knowledge
62 The court observed that plaintiff's attorney could have noticed the Illinois Supreme
Court of the difficulty of locating the transcript. Id. at 388.
,3 Id.
04 Id. at 389.
45 It should be noted that McCray was decided after Meyer..
63 338 F. Supp. at 390.
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by the defendant as to what the chattel is), and that state of mind known
as inadvertence which implies no knowledge as to what the chattel is."7
Although volitional, the act in Meyers was not shown to involve the
knowing exercise of control over the chattel (the transcript). In con-
trast, the court's hypothetical involves the misdirection of an object
whose identity is known.
The Meyers court refused to apply section 1983 in the face of an
admitted violation of constitutional rights because it feared that a
contrary result would
convert every minor mistake, especially in the milieu of the
prison, into a violation of § 1983. To hold prison officials to
such a high standard of strict liability would impose such an
impossible burden as to render prisons totally inoperable."'
But negligence is not the same as strict liability. When alleging negli-
gence, plaintiff must show unreasonable conduct in order to prevail.
Thus, in Meyers, the court could have found for defendents on the
ground that they acted reasonably under the circumstances. In contrast,
the fact that defendants acted reasonably would not prevent the applica-
tion of strict liability. It would have been preferable had the court dealt
first with the question of the existence of a fourteenth amendment duty
and its breach. Assuming such a breach, the court would next have
considered the appropriate defense, if any. Reasonableness under this
approach could be found to be a vaild defense because it is relevant to
the question of who should ultimately bear the loss. Instead, the
Meyers court seems to use the concept of strict liability as a straw man
which it rejects in order to avoid the adverse consequences of that basis
of liability.
The court's "floodgates" position in Meyers is smiliar to that
used by Judge Bryan, dissenting in Jenkins v. Averett.69 In Averett
the plaintiff, a black youth who had committed no crime and who had
never been charged with one, was shot by the defendant policeman
after a chase. The plaintiff alleged that the shooting was deliberate
while the defendant maintained it was accidental. The district court re-
jected plaintiff's 1983 claim because it found that defendant did not
intend to shoot plaintiff, but was instead grossly or culpably negligent.
67 Cf. RESTATEMENT § 222A ("What constitutes Conversion") and § 224 ("Non-
feasance and Negligence"). An intentional exercise of dominion or control over the
chattel is required for conversion; knowledge of the existence of those rights with which
defendant interferes is not necessary.
68 338 F. Supp. at 390 (emphasis added).
69 424 F.2d 1228, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970).
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Plaintiff's pendent state claim for assault and battery was successful
because under North Carolina law, gross or culpable negligence may
supply the intent necessary for assault and battery.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal
of the 1983 claim. It reasoned that plaintiff's fourth amendment right
to be free from physical injury arbitrarily inflicted by the police had been
violated. The court emphasized that it was dealing with gross negligence,
i.e., an arbitrary abuse of police power which was "the direct consequence
of defendant's wanton conduct in the course of his attempt to apprehend
the plaintiff."7 " Judge Bryan dissented on the 1983 issue, arguing that
section 1983 "was never envisioned as a means of recoupment for
injuries caused by the negligence of a State officer acting in the course of
his duty."'" Moreover, he raised the spectre of numerous 1983 actions
brought against state officials for alleged negligent conduct, contending
that "[t] he statute does not contemplate the conversion of every common
law responsibility into a 1983 case."72
While the majority responded to these arguments by emphasizing
that it was simply following state law in equating "gross or culpable"
negligence with arbitrariness and limited its decision to cases of "raw
abuse of power by a police officer," there is a more persuasive response
available. It is that a defendant's unreasonable conduct does not neces-
sarily result in his liability under section 1983. For example actionable
fourth amendment violations in all likelihood mu';t be intentional re-
gardless of reasonableness.7 3 They need not be willful in the sense that
the government official must know that another's fourth amendment
rights are being violated; the bodily contact, however, must be intended.74
70 Id. at 1232.
711d. at 1234.
72 Id. Judge Bryan gave two hypotheticals which he sugge3ted might be covered by
the majority's reasoning. First, a state health officer or official physician could be sued
for an accident, or for gross and culpable negligence, in treating a patient at a public
clinic. Second, a fireman driving state fire equipment answering an alarm could be sued
under section 1983 for injuries to spectators or to their private property resulting from
gross or culpable negligence. Judge Bryan argued that such a result is absurd. The
short answer is that he is right, but for the wrong reasons. The doctor and fireman
would not be liable because, irrespective of negligence, no con .titutional duty has been
breached.73 Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
74 While intentional conduct may be necessary for a fourth amendment violation, it
is not always sufficient. See, e.g., Daly v. Pederson, 278 F. Sipp. 88 (D. Minn. 1967)
(shoving by policeman of legally arrested person, while a technical battery, is neither a
fourth nor a fourteenth amendment violation, and hence not actionable under section
1983).
This view of the fourth amendment is consistent with those cases holding that where
an arrest is made without probable cause, a prima facie 1983 claim is presented. See, e.g.,
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968).
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Moreover, it is significant that in Averett the defendant was a
policeman. In many 1983 and fourth amendment cases there is a legiti-
mate concern with the potential for abuse of the policeman's authority.
Although other state officials could conceivably violate an individual's
fourth amendment rights, none (with the exception of prison author-
ities) are given as much discretion as police officers to use force in the
regular performance of their duties. This might explain why the Averett
majority extended somewhat the scope of the fourth amendment duty
and through it section 1983 to encompass a police officer's gross negli-
gence in using physical force.
Identifying the Constitutional Duty
By first attempting to identify the constitutional duty that has
allegedly been breached, courts can avoid the impractical expansion of
1983 liability that concerned the Meyers court and the dissent in Averett.
Courts that have properly focused on a constitutional duty have often
concluded that none is involved and, therefore, that no liability under
section 1983 has been incurred. For example, several recent decisions
involve prisoners' complaints alleging 1983 violations resulting from
negligent medical treatment by prison authorities. In denying 1983
applicability in these cases, two courts used language that suggests their
decisions were based on the ground that no constitutional right is
involved.7 For the same reason, courts have regularly dismissed com-
plaints alleging equal protection violations where prisoners claimed
that prison authorities negligently failed to protect them from assaults
by other inmates. The courts have held that more than an isolated in-
stance of negligence was necessary to support a 1983 claim.7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently struggled with
section 1983 and alleged deprivations of constitutional rights, privi-
leges and immunities. In Roberts v. Williams,77 plaintiff alleged that
defendant, a superintendent of a prison farm, negligently failed to train
and supervise a trusty guard whose shotgun discharged into plaintiff's
face while plaintiff was 'Working outside. The Fifth Circuit first affirmed
75"[A] tort claim for malpractice is not cognizable under [1983] jurisdiction."
Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973). "It is an abuse of the Civil Rights
Act to characterize a charge of negligence or malpractice, properly questions of state
law, as a violation of constitutional rights." Hopkins v. County of Cook, 305 F. Supp.
1011, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1969). But cf. Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1973)
("exceptional circumstances" exception).76 Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d
483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969).
77456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971), addendum, 456 F.2d 834
(5th Cir. 1972).
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a finding that eighth amendment rights had been violated but later 8
modified its opinion so that the defendant's liability was made to rest
not on section 1983 but on the pendent negligence claim under state
law. The Fifth Circuit may have been concerned with the possibility
of numerous 1983 claims based on alleged eighth amendment violations
if use of the eighth amendment were not limited to extreme situations
involving intentional conduct."' Thus it appears that, for 1983 purposes,
unintentional conduct may not constitute an eighth amendment
violation, just as unintentional conduct by prison officials does not vio-
late equal protection. In any event, focusing on the fourteenth amend-
ment duty involved properly directs attention to constitutional inter-
pretation and federal policy.
Proximate Cause
Notions of negligence and intentional conduct tend to obscure the
threshold concern in 1983 cases. That concern should be whether a
constitutional duty derived from the fourteenth amendment has been
breached. The tort concept of proximate cause sirmilarly obscures the
difficult 1983 policy question of the extent of liability where there has
been a clear infringement of constitutional rights. Even where section
1983 is found to impose the equivalent of absolute liability for breach
of a fourteenth amendment duty as in Whirl, the question of the extent
of the defendant's responsibility is still present; and, therefore, the
equivalent of a proximate cause inquiry may still be required. The
point, however, is that this inquiry should not be governed by tort
concepts."
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Duncan v. Nelson"' is an example
of the misuse of the tort concept of causation in a 1983 context.
Plaintiff, after being held in solitary confinement for 18 days on
78 Id. at 834-35.
7) The modification was based on the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Anderson v.
Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972), modifying 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971). There,
the court chose to base its finding of liability on the due process clause rather than the
eighth amendment. This substantive due process approach, however, not fully explained
in the court's decision, might also open the door to numerous 1983 claims. See note 21
supra. But cf. Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974).8 0 It seems preferable, for clarity of judicial analysis, to deal with proximate cause
in 1983 cases as a question of the scope of the fourteenth amendment duty and hence as
a question of law for the court. See note 60 supra & text accompanying. Professor
Green deals with the proximate cause question in the ordinary negligence case as a judi-
cial inquiry into the scope of the duty. Green, Foreseeabliy in Negligence Law, 61
CoLuM. L. Rxv. 1401 (1961). Cf. RESTATEmENT § 286 (court determines scope of statu-
tory duty in negligence per se situations).
81466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
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another charge, was interrogated by defendants for over 20 consecutive
hours. Finally, he confessed to murder. This confession was admitted
into evidence, and plaintiff was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.
After he had served eight years, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the confession should have been excluded and remanded the case for a
new trial. Plaintiff was acquitted at the second trial, and brought a
1983 action against defendant police officers, seeking damages for his
interrogation, conviction and incarceration.
The district court dismissed the complaint because "the act of the
trial judge in admitting the confession was a superseding, intervening
cause for which the defendants cannot be held liable."82 The Seventh
Circuit conceded that at first blush, a foreseeability test for proximate
cause would seem to extend to the plaintiff's incarceration. The court
nevertheless stated that the defendants were
presumed to have known the then existing law concerning involun-
tary confession .. . .Therefore . . . the defendants knew or
should have known that their actions in extracting this confession
from the plaintiff would render it involuntary and hence inadmis-
siblea8
Hence the court characterized as untenable the 'conclusion that the de-
fendants would foresee that the trial judge would erroneously admit
the unlawful confession.
As further support for its decision affirming the district court as to
plaintiff's conviction and incarceration (but reversing as to his inter-
rogation) the Seventh Circuit argued that, with respect to cause in fact,
there was no compelling inference that the confession "was the sole or
even material basis for [plaintiff's] initial conviction."8 The court
also noted that sentencing is a complex decision involving many factors
and "it does not follow that the particular sentence imposed upon the
plaintiff was a proximate result of that conviction.""
Had the court directly approached this case as one involving policy
under section 1983 and not tort principles alone, it would have con-
fronted the question of whether imposing liability on the defendants
for the conviction and incarceration is consistent with the purposes of
section 1983. Instead, the court used a negligence concept of supersed-
ing cause which even from a tort perspective should not necessarily
be used to limit defendant's liability in an intentional conduct context
821d. at 942.
asId.
84 Id. at 943.
85 Id.
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such as Duncan.8" Furthermore, the concept of proximate cause in tort
law involves policy considerations respecting accountability for harm
caused which might fie different from those considerations respecting
accountability under section 1983. For example, as mentioned earlier,
one function of liability under section 1983 might be deterrence. In
Duncan, holding defendants liable would arguably further the goal of
preventing police officers from abusing their authority in order to obtain
a conviction. 7
In short, it aids analysis, and is more consistent with the four-
teenth amendment enforcement purpose of section 1983 as well as that
section's language, to suggest that it is the nature and scope of the
particular fourteenth amendment duty,8 and not traditional tort con-
cepts, which determine whether a defendant is liable. and the extent of
his liability."9
s Prosser has suggested that accountability for intentional torts in a proximate
cause sense extends beyond that for negligence. PRossER, supra note 55, at 30-31.
See also RESTATEMENT § 870, discussed and applied in a 1983 context in Johnson v. Greer,
477 F.2d 101, 107 (5th Cir. 1973); see also note 87 infra.
The court also approached the cause-in-fact question in "but for" terms. However,
this test has been persuasively criticized. Thode, The Indefensibl,, Use of the Hypotheti-
cal Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TExAs L. REv. 423 (1968) ; Green, The Causal
Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MicH. L. Rv. 543 (1962).8 7 On the other hand, the scope of the fourteenth amendment duty breached here by
the police officers should perhaps not extend so far as argued by the plaintiff. As in all
scope of duty or proximate cause inquiries, a line must be drav.'n somewhere. It may
well be unduly harsh as a matter of federal policy to hold deftndants accountable for
plaintiff's conviction and incarceration, given the subsequent judical conduct in admitting
the confession and sentencing the plaintiff. While this sense ma3 be at the heart of the
decision in Duncan, the question of the scope of duty should not lave been addressed ex-
clusively in tort terms. The assistance of tort concepts in 198" cases is far different
from their dispositiveness. But see Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 107 (5th Cir. 1973),
quoting RESTATEmENT § 870, comment g (standard of both tort mnd section 1983 causa-
tion is whether, from the standpoint of the reasonable man, defendant's act had "in
some degree increased the risk of that harm [suffered by plaintiff ]").
88 I therefore disagree with the recent analysis of the relatioaship between tort law
and section 1983 set forth in McCormack, Federalism and Sectio; 1983: Limitations on
Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974). Aft-
er stating that the basis of liability in Monroe centers on the question of whether the
officer "should reasonably have known that [his acts] would proluce results that were
unconstitutional," id. at 54, the author points out that "negligent violations of constitu-
tional rights were not the concern of [section 1983]." Id. at 55. There appears to be an
inconsistency in these statements since "should have known" is typical negligence lan-
guage. This inconsistency is made more apparent when the author speaks immediately
thereafter of a "personal defense for the officer who acts within the scope of his authority
in good faith reliance on state law," and explains that this means reasonable action by the
officer. Id. (emphasis added). I concur that reasonableness is relevant in Monroe and
in other 1983 situations, but as an affirmative defense with the burden of proof of reason-
ableness on the defendant, as discussed in the next section of this article. It cannot be
relevant both to the prima facie claim and the defense, as the author seems to indicate.
I have argued, of course, that the question of breach of duty in 1933 cases is one of con-
stitutional interpretation, not to be based simply on tort concepts.
89 If the foregoing emphasis upon federal policy under section 1983 is correct, it fol-
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Good Faith and Reasonableness
Just as common law concepts governing the existence of a prima
lows that an insistence that damages awarded in 1983 actions must be based solely on
damage concepts developed from the common law is unsound. That is, not only should
damages in 1983 cases not be dependent upon local state law, but to the extent that a
uniform federal common law of damages in civil rights actions is developed, it should
further the purposes of section 1983. Certain aspects of this issue have been discussed
elsewhere. See, e.g., Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under the Civil Rights
Act: Some Problems in Federalism, A3 DENVER L.J. 480 (1966) ; Comment, Civil Actions
for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1015 (1967).
See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1961). Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969)
(damages rules used in 1988 cases should serve policies expressed in such civil rights
statutes). However, courts still tend in 1983 cases to look for traditional tort damage.
This tendency seems in part responsible for those decisions holding that a violation by
police officers of Miranda directives, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not
of itself give rise to a 1983 action absent the illegal use of information thus obtained in
a criminal case. In Ransom v. City of Philadelphia, 311 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
for example, the court said:
[U]nless and until some use is made of an illegally obtained confession in such a
way as to deprive a person of constitutional rights, no claim is stated under the
Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff may have to await the outcome of his state court
criminal proceedings before he may base a claim upon the allegedly improperly
obtained confession.
Id. at 974. Similarly, in Allen v. Eicher, 295 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1969), the court
stated:
However, Miranda does not per se make an interrogation which violates its pre-
cepts into an actionable tort. Unlike an illegal arrest, or an illegal search or
seizure, an improper interrogation is not itself a tort. Nor does an interroga-
tion, in and of itself, constitute a denial of the constitutional rights of the person
being interrogated.
Id. at 1185-86. Given a valid arrest, these cases indicate that there is no tort committed
as a result of interrogation alone because there has been no injury to an interest pro-
tected by the common law of torts.
After Miranda, however, an individual has a constitutionally protected interest in be-
ing free from such interrogations, an interest which was allegedly infringed by de-
fendants' breach of duty in these cases. Miranda set up a constitutional rule, the breach
of which might constitute actionable negligence per se inasmuch as nominal dam-
ages at least are presumed from the violation of fourteenth amendment rights.
Moreover, "a plaintiff who proves only an intangible loss of civil rights or purely
.mental suffering may . . .be awarded substantial compensatory damages." Magnett v.
Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1973). Juries can value the fourteenth amendment
interest interfered with in the same way they now value the interests in freedom from
confinement (false imprisonment), in freedom from apprehension of imminent harmful
or offensive bodily contact (assault) and in reputation (defamation). D. DOBBS, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF REmEDIES 528-31 (1973). Cf. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
327 U.S. 251 (1946) (because economic harm is difficult to value in private antitrust law-
suits, defendant should bear the risk of uncertainty once the plaintiff proves some loss).
Compare the approach of some federal courts confronted with the jurisdictional amount
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in lawsuits against federal officers raising constitutional
issues. See P. BATOR, D. SHAPino, P. MISHxiN, & H. WEcHsLER, HART AND WEcHs-
La'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTnm 1158-60 (2d ed. 1973).
However, Ransom and Allen might arguably be justified on the ground that Miranda
was aimed only at admission into evidence of such tainted information; that is, Miranda
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facie tort should not determine 1983 liability, so should common law
tort defenses not necessarily determine 1983 defenses. Yet, in Pierson
-v. Ray,"° the Court quoted Justice Douglas' dictum from Monroe in
support of its holding that the tort defense to false arrest at common law
was also applicable to section 1983. Pierson involved a 1983 action
brought by clergymen against police officers. The police officers had
arrested the clergymen for allegedly violating a statute dealing with
breaches of the peace. This statute was thereafter held unconstitutional,
and, subsequently, plaintiffs brought their 1983 action. They con-
tended that they were arrested solely for attempting to integrate public
facilities, that there was no crowd present and hence no threatened
disturbance. To their 1983 claim based upon the defendants' inten-
tional conduct they joined the pendent tort claims of false arrest and
imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
while the common law defense of good faith and probable cause was
available to defendants under state law, it was not available in actions
under section 1983.91
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that good
faith and probable cause constituted a defense avail.-ble to police officers
in 1983 proceedings. The Court argued that "[p]art of the background
of tort liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is the
defense of good faith and probable cause."92 It relied on section 121
of the Restatement of Torts, which provides for a police officer's privi-
lege to arrest where he "reasonably suspects that suc-i an act or omission
(i.e., a felony) has been committed and that the cther has committed
it." 3 As applied to the facts before it, the Court ruled that the test was
is a shield and not a sword. On the other hand, inasmuch as the Court's decision in
Miranda was designed to influence police behavior, a 1983 action for its violation seems
consistent with this purpose. Therefore, McCray, which upheld a cause of action under
section 1983 against defendant court clerk for allegedly interfer ng with plaintiff's right
of access to the courts, might be sound in result so far as the issue of damages is con-
cerned. That it might be difficult to value the injury to plaintiff's constitutional interest
is insufficient to support a decision that there is no cause of action stated.
fl 386 U.S. 547, 556 (1967). See also Leverne v. Coming, 354 F. Supp. 1402, 1404
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("the courts have recognized the principle that in § 1983 cases the avail-
ability of a particular defense will depend upon whether it could be similarly used as a
defense to tort liability in the parallel common law cause of action.")
'0 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965).Q2 386 U.S. at 556-57. But cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968) :
There is nothing in the language of the antitrust acts which indicates that Con-
gress wanted to make the common law pari delicto doctrine a defense to treble-
damage actions . . . [The] private action [is] a bulwark of antitrust enforce-
ment.
9 RESTATEMENT § 121(b).
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whether "the officers reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest
was constitutional . .
While the Court spoke of the background of tort liability, it never-
theless seemed to consider the federal, state, and individual interests
involved when it suggested that an officer should not have to choose
between dereliction of statutory duty on the one hand and liability for
damages on the other. This choice, the Court held, should not be put to
an officer regardless of whether common law or 1983 interests are
involved."
94 386 U.S. at 557. It should be noted that the question decided by the court respect-
ing an arrest under a statute later held unconstitutional is expressly left open in RESTATE-
MENT § 121, caveat to comment i. Thus, the Court's application of the good faith and
probable cause defense in Pierson goes beyond the Restatement.
95 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), similarly spoke both of tort liability
and the federal interests at stake. There, it will be remembered, defendant attempted to
apply the Pierson defense to the 1983 action. The court held that while good faith and
probable cause was a defense at common law to false arrest, it was not a defense to false
imprisonment standing alone. Since plaintiff's fourteenth amendment rights were vio-
lated because of the imprisonment and not the arrest, the Fifth Circuit in Whirl did not
apply the Pierson defense. If tort concepts are to be followed, this was proper because
the Restatement, cited in Pierson, refers to false arrest; so does the treatise cited by the
Court. See 1 F. HARPEa & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 3.18 (1956), cited at 386
U.S. 555. More important, however, than this reliance on common law tort doctrine
should be the federal policy of section 1983 in imposing a fourteenth amendment duty
-upon one who has the power and responsibility to determine the validity of plaintiff's
continued imprisonment. Reasonableness and good faith should not be a defense here.
By way of contrast, the Pierson test is appropriate in fourth amendment arrest situations
where police officers must act quickly under pressure; it ensures that there will be no
liability for damages where the arrested person is later acquitted so long as there is good
faith and a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest.
In this connection the Court in Pierson characterized the defense to false arrest as
good faith and probable cause. Yet RESTATEMENT § 121(b), cited by the Court, speaks
of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. RESTATEMENT § 119, comment j, defines
reasonable suspicion as follows:
[I]t is not necessary that the actor shall believe that the other is guilty of
the felony. It is enough that the circumstances which the actor knows or rea-
sonably believes to exist are such as to create a reasonable belief that there is a
likelihood that the other has committed the felony.
In addition, the black letter provisions of the relevant Restatement sections (119 and 121)
say nothing of good faith. Apparently the Court in Pierson derived this requirement
from comment g to § 121, which speaks of the need to protect peace officers from li-
ability for the consequences of honest and reasonable mistakes. Thus the question arises:
to what extent does the fourth amendment concept of probable cause, defined as the
sufficiency of the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officers to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an
offense, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), track the false arrest defense for purposes
of 1983 liability?
There is some confusion in the cases regarding the answer. Perhaps the most im-
portant discussion of the implications is in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972):
[T]o prevail the police officer need not allege and prove probable cause in the
constitutional sense. The standard governing police conduct is composed .of two
elements, the first is subjective and the second is objective. Thus the officer
must allege and prove not only that he believed, in good faith, that his conduct
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The Pierson test was enunciated in an arrest situation. Several
federal courts, however, have applied the test of good faith and reason-
able belief in the legality of conduct to other factual situations." Even
if this is sound, it might still be appropriate to limit such a rule of reason-
ableness and good faith to situations in which defendants are put to a
choice, whether hurried or not, on the ground that defendants ought not
to be penalized for acting reasonably, even though their actions turned
out to be unconstitutional. Perhaps acting "reasonably" should mean
that where feasible, the defendant confronted with a choice must have
sought legal advice. For example, if officials of a public university
prohibit a demonstration because after seeking advice of counsel they
believe in good faith that the demonstration is illegal, they should not
be liable under section 1983 even though they ran the risk of infringing
upon the first amendment rights of the demonstrators. 7 But where,
was lawful, but also that his belief was reasonable.
Id. at 1348. The court considered this test to be identical to the Pierson test as applied to
peace officers and suggested that it would be incongruous were state police officers held to
a different standard under 1983 federal law as compared with the standard applicable to
federal police officers under fourth amendment federal law.
If one accepts the proposition that the proper standard for the tort defense should
be different from probable cause, one has to ask how the tests actually differ. One way
seems clear: an arrest may be invalid and seized evidence excluded regardless of subjec-
tive good faith on the part of the policeman. Here the fourth amendment is used as a
shield and the test is objective. But how does reasonable belief in the validity of the
arrest and search differ from probable cause? Clearly the Second Circuit did not intend
simply to add to the requirement of probable cause a second requirement of good faith.
The court seems to be saying that there might be situations where there is no probable
cause, and yet there is a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search. We
are not told, however, what factors are to be taken into account in making this deter-
mination.
On balance, the court's reason for attempting to make the distinction between prob-
able cause and the reasonable belief-good faith test seems sound. It is likely that the
possibility that a police officer may be liable in damages will act as a more serious de-
terrent to his carrying out his duties than the possibility that the defendant may go free.
See also Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1974) (following Bivens rationale in a
1983 arrest case).
ic Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973) (reasorable good faith is a de-
fense to a 1983 claim against a legislative clerk who refused plaintiff a job as a page
because of her sex); Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1973) (reasonable
good faith reliance on standard operating procedure a defense to a 1983 claim of due
process violations in a prison disciplinary proceeding). These cases may reflect a judi-
cial reluctance to apply "new" constitutional interpretation retroactively in an action for
damages. Inasmuch as a state officer might be an inappropriate cost-bearer in such situ-
ations, this approach would properly extend the Pierson rationale beyond arrest situations
to include all instances of good faith and reasonable belief in the legal validity of one's
conduct.
97 Handverger v. Harvill, 479 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1973). It is possible to limit the
defense of good faith and reasonableness even further to situations in which either the
defendant's decision is hurried or legal advice is available be.use the decision is not
hurried, thereby imposing this obligation on those whose decision need not be hurried.
This would still include Handverger and Skinner, but probably exclude from protection
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as in Whirl v. Kern, a sheriff, unaware of a prisoner's discharge papers,
keeps him imprisoned, there is no element of choice involved, and this
is not the fault of plaintiff. Good faith and even a jury finding that the
sheriff acted reasonably should therefore not be a defense to a claim
that defendant's breach of his fourteenth amendment duty is action-
able under section 1983. Similarly in McCray v. Maryland, where
it was alleged that the clerk had negligently failed to file plaintiff's
petition for post-conviction relief, no choice based upon an assessment
of legal validity was involved.
Consequently, the Pierson defense ought not to be generally applied
in all 1983 cases. Courts which do so make the same mistake as those
courts which look exclusively to the common law torf defenses for
guidance in 1983 cases. Rather, the nature of the appropriate defenses
in 1983 cases depends in large part upon the particular constitutional
infringement alleged, the choices available to the defendant, the appro-
priateness of having the defendant bear the costs alone, and the effect of
liability upon the performance of the defendant's state obligations.
Consent
Pierson also raises an issue seldom discussed, the applicability of
the defense of consent 8 to 1983 claims. In Pierson, plaintiffs' 1983 claim
was based on an allegedly invalid arrest. One of defendants' arguments,
in fact accepted by the Fifth Circuit, was that the plaintiffs had invited
or consented to their arrest and imprisonment, and hence should be
denied recovery. The Fifth Circuit expressly stated that "the tort prin-
ciple of volenti non fit injuria applies to the claim asserted for a civil
rights violation under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 as well as to the common
law cause of action."99 The Supreme Court disagreed on this issue,
saying:
the legislative clerk in Eslinger who apparently did not rely on legal advice but on "cus-
tom" only.
98 By implication, this also raises the use of defenses such as assumption of risk and
contributory negligence in 1983 actions. Of course, assumption of risk, see RESTATEMFNT
§§ 496A, 496B, 496C, and especially express assumption of risk is similar to the defense
of consent as used in intentional conduct situations. The analysis of consent here may
therefore to that extent also be applicable to assumption of risk. But this article will not
expressly deal with these defenses. It will also not deal with the interesting question of
whether there should be such a defense of assumption of the risk at all; see James,
Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968) ; or if it is pref-
erable to deal with reasonable assumption of risk as a duty question. However, in Whirl
v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1969), discussed at note 41 sup ra, where plain-
tiff had been unlawfully detained in jail by defendant sheriff, defendant argued that plain-
.tiff had been contributorily negligent in not requesting a hearing or requesting the service
of a court appointed lawyer. The court responded by noting that defendant had com-
mitted an intentional tort to which contributory negligence is not a defense.
99 352 F.2d at 221.
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The case contains no proof or allegation that they in any way
tricked or goaded the officers into arresting them. The petitioners
had the right to use the waiting room of the Jackson bus terminal,
and their deliberate exercise of that right in a peaceful, orderly,
and inoffensive manner does not disqualify them from seeking
damages under § 1983.100
The Court's decision as to consent might be explained on several
grounds. The Court might be saying that just as "the criminal law 'n
many cases refuses to recognize the consent of the injured party as a
defense,""" because the "public" has been harmed, so too should consent
to unconstitutional conduct be considered no defense. This approach
derives some support from the view that consent to a criminal act will
not protect a defendant from tort liability.1 2 Yet, Pierson apparently
did not involve criminal conduct by the defendants. Even if the analogy
is sound, the developing view of consent, as reflected in the Restate-
ment,' indicates that as a general matter consent is effective in cases
involving criminal conduct.
A second possible explanation is that Pierson did not in fact involve
consent. In Pierson, it was substantially undisputed "that the peti-
tioners went to Jackson expecting to be illegally arrested."10' How-
ever, Tentative Draft No. 18 to the Restatement defines consent as
willingness in fact for the conduct to occur, regardless of whether the
consent has been communicated to the actor."0 5 Thus, in Pierson, the
plaintiffs' expectation that they would be arrested and imprisoned is
not the same as their willingness to be arrested and imprisoned. The
fact that there was no resistance should not be dispositive; absence of
resistance is not necessary where there is the apparent authority to
arrest and imprison.
But even if there was true consent in Pierson, it is possible to
justify the decision on another basis. As a matter of tort doctrine,
plaintiff is ordinarily barred by consent to the particular conduct of the
actor when that conduct is intended to invade plaintiff's interests.'
There is little concern with plaintiff's knowledge of the legal conse-
quences of his consent, but only its factual consequences. Perhaps where
constitutional rights are involved, there must be rot only consent to
100 386 U.S. at 558 (footnote omitted).
101 PRossER, supra note 55, at 107.
102 Id. But see RESTATEMENT § 60.
103 Id.
104 386 U.S. at 558.
105 RESTATEmENT § 892(1).
1o Id.
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the conduct but knowledge that a constitutional right is being waived.
Pierson could thus be understood as a case in which there was no
waiver of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Put another way, consent
to defendant's conduct in a 1983 case might be a defense only where
plaintiff knows he has both the opportunity and the right not to con-
sent.
CONCLUSION
The major reason for the concern of some courts and commen-
tators with liability under section 1983 is that section's very broad
language. On its face it requires only state action and a causal relation
between defendant's conduct and the deprivation of fourteenth amend-
ment rights. This concern has increased as a result of federal decisions
which indicate that unintentional conduct may be covered by section
1983, that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required and
that the full panoply of fourteenth amendment rights, whether derived
from the Bill of Rights or directly from the fourteenth amendment,
may serve as the basis for liability when violated.
While the scope of section 1983 should be broad, there are certain
limitations inherent in its use. First, a constitutional duty and standard
of conduct must be identified; this is not always a simple matter. Second,
liability under section 1983 should be consistent with that section's
purposes which, while including compensation, seem in larger part
designed to provide for private enforcement of fourteenth amendment
rights and hence to help deter their violation. It is in this connection
that the background of tort liability is relevant. To the extent that tort
concepts of duty, proximate cause, and cause in fact, as well as various
defenses such as consent may assist a court by analogy in deciding 1983
cases, well and good. But courts in 1983 cases must be careful not to
let tort law alone determine 1983 liability; for not only possibly different
107 The Supreme Court follows this approach in some criminal law contexts, e.g., the
Miranda warnings and information about trial rights, but recently refused to extend it to
the judicial inquiry into the existence of consent to a search. Instead the Court held that
a criminal defendant's awareness of his right to refuse to consent to a search is only one
factor to be taken into account. Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). It
must be acknowledged that waiver doctrine was developed in criminal cases. See also
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Yet the Court in Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405
U.S. 174 (1972), noted that the doctrine of waiver is applicable in a civil context as well,
and assumed for the purpose of deciding the case before it that "the standard for waiver
in a corporate property right case of this kind is the same standard applicable to waiver
in a criminal proceeding, that is, that it be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently
made . . . ." Id. at 782. Indeed, inasmuch as section 1983 involves fourteenth amend-
ment rights, the analogy to the criminal process seems even stronger than that of the
"corporate property right" Overmyer case.
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purposes, but different interests as well are usually at stake.
A federal common law for 1983 liability should modify tort law
wherever appropriate. Modifications of tort law in order to serve federal
policy have occurred elsewhere where constitutional interests have not
been involved.' It is time for federal courts dealing with the constitu-
tional interests implicated by section 1983 to do the same.
108 See note 35 mipra.
